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Abstract 
This paper examines the economic role of the merchant coalition (kabu nakama) 
in Japan during the the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century in Japan.  
During this period public sector enforcement of contracts was imperfect.  Kabu nakama 
substituted for the public sector, using a multilateral punishment strategy.  When the 
government (Bakufu) prohibited kabu nakama in 1841, the growth rate of the real 
money supply contracted, efficiency of price arbitrage declined, and the inflation rate 
increased. 
 
Key words: merchant coalition, kabu nakama, Japan, institution, multilateral 
punishment strategy, enforcement     
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This paper examines the economic role of kabu nakama, a coalition of merchants 
or artisans, in Japanese economic development during the eighteenth and the first half 
of the nineteenth centuries (hereafter, the Edo Era).  The analysis is related to three 
strands of the literature. The first is the methodological literature on institutions in 
economic history.  North and Thomas(1973); North(1990, 1991) have emphasized the 
role of institutions, especially public institutions for protecting property rights, as a 
prerequisite for modern economic development). More recently, Greif (1989, 1993) ; Aoki 
(2001); and Hayami and Aoki (1998) have shown self-enforcing private institutions 
might substitute for or complement public institutions. 
The second strand is the literature on the Japanese economic development.  This 
literature has made clear that Japan had a market economy during the Edo era 
(Crawcour and Yamamura 1970, Duffy and Yamamura 1971, Crawcour 1974, Smith 
1973, Sinbo 1978, Ohkura and Shinbo 1978, Hanley 1983,  Yasuba 1987, Sinbo and Saito 
1989, Ito 1993, Wakita 1996). According to Iwahashi (1988), numerous institutions 
supporting economic development existed during the Edo era, including a stable 
political regime, a land tax system providing peasants with production incentives, the 
unified weights and measures, among others. However, Iwahashi (1988) does not 
address the issue of public enforcement of contracts, which is an essential feature of the 
North’s framework. As discussed in Section 2, the public system for contract 
enforcement was seriously flawed during the Edo period.  
The third strand of the literature is that on kabu nakama. The classic book on 
kabu nakama by Mataji Miyamoto noted that “the intermediate organizations, such as 
kabu nakama, could exist only on the condition that the state or the public authorities 
were not well developed … in pre-modern Japan, the statutory commercial law had not 
yet been legislated and the formal commercial rules did not exist … the commercial 
customs of kabu nakama were the only standards for trade, and not only did the 
Bakufu’s court refer to the customs, but also each kabu nakama itself resolved 
commercial conflicts” (Miyamoto 1938, pp.151–152).  That is, Miyamoto suggested that 
private organizations played the role of contract enforcers in a society in which the 
public system of third party enforcement was imperfect, but he did not develop this 
insight fully nor did he test it empirically.1
In this paper, I examine empirically the contract enforcement function of kabu 
nakama. As discussed later, the Bakufu prohibited and dissolved kabu nakama in 1842.  
This historical event can be regarded as a type of “natural experiment” for testing the 
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overview of the economic development and the legal system in Edo Era Japan, from 
which we derive the puzzle mentioned above.  In Section 3, we examine the codes of kabu 
nakama, and present the contract enforcement hypothesis of kabu nakama.  In Section 4, 
we test the hypothesis.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Economic development and legal system in Edo Era: An overview 
(1) Development of the market economy 
Akashi (1989) measured economic growth in Japan from 1725 to 1856 based on 
estimates of the real money supply.  He concluded that an upward trend in real money 
emerged after 1790.  Assuming a constant velocity, the implication is that economic 
growth began in Japan just before the turn of the nineteenth century.2  This timing is 
important, because it contradicts the prevailing wisdom that economic growth did not 
really begin until the 1820s (Akashi 1989, pp.47–48).  The onset of economic growth in 
1790 coincides with the so-called Tanuma Period, when Roju (the head of the Bakufu 
bureaucracy) Okitsugu Tanuma implemented a policy promoting kabu nakama. 
As noted in the Introduction, there is considerable evidence of a market economy in 
Japan during the Edo era.  Commerce was based on credit (Shinbo 1956, pp.116-117; 
Miyamoto 1961, p.61; Fujita, Miyamoto and Hasegawa 1978, pp.112–113).  The 
significance of credit is illustrated by an example of Hasegawa, a major cotton 
wholesaler (Kitajima 1962, p.182). Hasegawa stocked cotton clothes from buyers in 
several cotton weaving areas.  For this purpose, Hasegawa sent money to buyers in 
those areas in advance of delivery.  In 1705, the credit given to the buyers was 22% of 
Hasegawa’s total assets. 
Iwahashi (1981) and Miyamoto (1988) examined the efficiency of the market 
mechanism, with a focus on price arbitrage between local rice markets.  Miyamoto 
(1988) calculated correlation coefficients of the growth rates of rice prices in five regions, 
namely Edo, Osaka, Nagoya, Hiroshima and Aizu, and found that the coefficients 
increased from 0.57 in the second half of the seventeenth century to 0.72 in the first half 
of the nineteenth century (Table 1).  Miyamoto (1988) also calculated correlation 
coefficients using the data of twelve local rice markets3.  While an upward trend of the 
coefficients was not observed, the coefficients were as large as around 0.7 in the 
eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century.   
Ito (1993) and Wakita(1996) tested the efficiency of the rice market using a more 
sophisticated methodology.  The Dojima Rice Exchange in Osaka was one of the earliest 
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of cash settlement of rice futures as well as a membership system. Rice futures were 
traded during a certain period.  Ito (1993) tested econometrically whether the futures 
price on the first day of the trading period was an unbiased estimator of the price on the 
last day of the period, as predicted by the efficient market hypothesis.  On the basis of 
the estimates, Ito rejected the efficient market hypothesis. However, Wakita (1996) 
retested the hypothesis, splitting the data by season, and showed that the efficient 
market hypothesis could not be rejected for the spring and autumn markets. 
 
(2) Legal system 
 
Assuming that a market economy existed during the Edo period one might 
suppose that there was public enforcement of contracts that worked tolerably well. 
However, this was not the case. Our knowledge of the legal system during the Edo 
period derives from scholarly work by Ishii (1960), Henderson (1965), Takigawa (1985), 
and Maki and Fujiwara(1995). As in the modern legal system, law suits were classified 
into the criminal affairs (ginmi suji) and the civil affairs (deiri suji). 
Civil suits were classified into three subcategories, honkuji (main suits), kanekuji 
(money suits) and nakamagoto (mutual affairs). Kanekuji was a suit concerning credit 
with interest and credit without collateral.  Nakamagoto was a suit concerning 
distribution of profit within a private organization.  Honkuji was a civil suit other than 
kanekuji and nakamagoto.  The claims most rigidly protected by the Bakufu authorities 
were the claims concerning honkuji, while the other extreme was nakamagoto. 
Regarding nakamagoto, the Bakufu authorities did not generally accept a suit, on the 
grounds that it should be resolved within the organization. Kanekuji lay in between, and 
protection of the plaintiff’s claims was relatively weak, compared with those concerning 
honkuji (Henderson 1965, pp.106-116; Maki and Fujiwara 1995, pp.241-242). 
The weakness of the plaintiff’s claims concerning kanekuji was reflected in Aitai 
Sumashi Rei, (Mutual Settlement Decree), prescribing that the Bakufu authorities 
would not accept kanekuji suits.  In Edo City, Aitai Sumashi Rei were promulgated in 
1622, 1661, 1663, 1682, 1685, 1702, 1719, 1746, 1789, 1797 and 1842, which means that 
those decrees were not exceptional.  Those decrees, except that in 1719, applied to all 
claims before the promulgation of the decree.  The decree of 1719 applied to future 
claims as well, until it was repealed in 1729 (Henderson 1965, p.107). Aitai Sumashi Rei 
did not deny the claim itself, but it is notable that the Bakufu authorities from time to 
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3. Organization and function of kabu nakama 
Kabu nakama is defined as “a group composed of members who have kabu.”  Kabu 
means a business license granted by the public authorities. That license and therefore 
the organization of kabu nakama was regional, for example in Edo or in Osaka.  In many 
cases, the grant of kabu was based on application by a group of merchants or artisans. 
Usually kabu was embodied in a wooden card, and was an object of inheritance, loan, 
pawn and trade.  If a member of kabu nakama intended to sell his kabu, he needed the 
approval of the other members. Each kabu nakama had a members’ meeting (yoriai) as 
an organization for decision making, and a manager (gyoji) as its executive (Miyamoto 
1938, chapters 2, 3).  The size of the membership differed from nakama to nakama.  
Higaki Kaisen Tsumi Ton’ya Nakama was a league of major kabu nakama in Edo.  In 
1813 it was composed of 63 kabu nakama.  The size of these nakama varied from 1 to 113, 
and the average was 314.    
Kabu nakama emerged in the seventeenth century.  In the early seventeenth 
century, the Bakufu prohibited the private collusion of merchants and artisans, 
following the policy prohibiting coalitions (za) by Hideyoshi Toyotomi, who unified the 
nation for the first time after the Muromachi Bakufu lost power in the late fifteenth 
century.  However, the policy changed in the middle of the seventeenth century.  As a 
part of the Kyoho Reform in the early eighteenth century, the Bakufu adopted a policy 
promoting kabu nakama for the purpose of controlling prices and distribution.  Moreover, 
as mentioned in Section 2, during the Tanuma Period in the 1770s and the 1780s, the 
Bakufu promoted kabu nakama still more actively to collect taxes, as well as to expand 
commerce (Duffy and Yamamura 1971, p.397; Inoue et al. 1988, p.823). 
Miyamoto (1938) classified the functions of kabu nakama into four categories, 
namely, monopoly, protection of interest, coordination, and maintenance of reputation.  
Included in the categories of protection of interest and maintenance of reputation was 
the function of contract enforcement.  For example, “The Code of Salt Wholesale 
Merchants” (1741) prescribed that “[i]f a broker cheats one of the members of the kabu 
nakama concerning the salt price, all of the nakama members should promise to 
suspend trade with the broker who cheated.”   
The mode of conduct prescribed in the Code was equivalent to the multilateral 
punishment strategy (MPS), which Greif (1993) argued described the behavior of 
Maghribis traders in medieval Mediterranean society. As Greif (1993) showed, under 
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merchant but also with all of the other members of the coalition. Therefore, the agent 
would choose to be honest rather than to cheat for a single gain. 
The cases in which kabu nakama adopted the MPS regarding commercial trade 
were not limited to the example of the salt merchants mentioned above.  A systematic 
survey of kabu nakama is not available, but Miyamoto (1938) cited many codes.  Among 
these are eleven cases prescribing the MPS concerning commercial trade. As an example 
of cheating worthy of punishment, nine of the eleven specified the failure to pay for 
commodities delivered in advance.  Other examples include non-payment of commission, 
failure to deliver a commodity and the provision of a poor quality commodity. 
Kabu nakama applied the punishment strategy not only to commodity trade, but 
also to organizing production, such as the putting-out system. The putting-out system 
played a major role in the weaving industry during the Edo era (Abe 1988).  Landes 
(1969) asserted that embezzlement of yearn was a frequent problem in weaving.5  The 
relationship between a weaver and a subcontractor can be regarded as a typical agency 
relationship with asymmetric information, and the weaver was always faced with the 
possibility of embezzlement by the subcontractor. Therefore, without an effective 
mechanism for overcoming this problem, the putting out system might flounder.  During 
the Edo era the mechanism was provided by kabu nakama. 
Consider, for example, the case of the silk weaving industry in Kiryu, where 
production was mainly organized by the putting out system. The silk weaving industry 
in Kiryu was started in the early eighteenth century.  Kabu nakama was organized 
almost at the same time, namely, the Silk Broker Nakama in 1713, the Spreader 
Nakama in 1774 and the Weaver Nakama in 1797 (The Editorial Committee of the 
History of Kiryu Weavings 1935, pp.360–361). The Code of the Weaver Nakama in 1824 
prescribed that “[i]f a spinner or a subcontracting weaver returns products containing 
less yarns than the weaver supplied, the price of the yarns deficit should be subtracted 
from the payment to the spinner or the subcontracting weaver.  If cheating occurs, the 
nakama m e m b e r  s h o u l d  r e p o r t  i t  t o  t h e  nakama manager.  In this case, all of the 
nakama members should not entrust yarns or weaving machines to the cheater.”    
Another example comes from Osaka.  The code of the Seven Nakama of Wool and 
Cotton prescribed that “The cloth dyeing should be entrusted to the members of a 
certain dyeing artisan nakama.  If an artisan cheats one of our members, the Seven 
Nakama should agree not to entrust dyeing to the artisan, and this measure should be 
written down by each of our members.” (Miyamoto 1938, p.200ʣ. 
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Some weavers in Kiryu directly employed workers in their workshops, besides 
subcontractors under the putting out system. With respect to these employees, the above 
mentioned Code in 1824 prescribed that “If a male employee, a female employee, or a 
temporary worker cheats one of the members, and it cannot be ignored, the cheated 
member should report it to the nakama manager.  We should write the cheater’s name 
on the black list, and never employ him or her.”  
Examples of the MPS concerning employment relationships are also found in the 
codes of the merchant nakama. The Code of the Rice and Exchange Nakama in 1751 
prescribed that “[i]f a member discharges a servant, a sales clerk or a shop boy because 
of cheating, he should announce it to the other members.  The nakama members should 
not employ the cheater, even if the ex-employer has no objection to do so.”  Miyamoto 
(1938) interpreted that this prescription aimed to prevent from draining the confidential 
code, skill, knowledge and the ex-employer’s relationships with customers.  This 
interpretation is reflected in the fact that Miyamoto (1938) classified these cases in the 
category of coordination rather than protection of interest.  It is true that concerning 
some kabu nakama his interpretation is correct, because they prescribed that the other 
members could employ the dismissed employee, if the ex-employer approved.  However, 
in cases where re-employment was prohibited whether the ex-employer approved or not, 
like the Rice and Exchange Nakama mentioned above, the reason cannot be to avoid 
leakage of knowledge.  It is more appropriately interpreted as the MPS. The MPS is 
clearly observed in the case of the Code of Domestic Raw Indigo Broker Nakama.  It 
prescribed that all the nakama members should not hire the ex-employee who cheated, 
but that if the employee was dismissed peacefully, the members could employ him after 
inquiries to the ex-employer.  Those cases indicate that kabu nakama played the role of 
supporting the employment relationship through the MPS.   
How pervasive was the MPS as a punishment strategy?  It is difficult to answer 
this question, because a comprehensive survey of kabu nakama codes is not available, 
but some conjecture is possible.  In 1868, just after the Meiji Restoration, the new 
government dissolved kabu nakama.  Ten years later, the Osaka Chamber of Commerce 
tried to promote commercial and industrial associations by developing a model code of 
associations, which was adopted in 1882. In the model code, the MPS for a cheating 
employee was included (Miyamoto 1976, pp.815-824).  This suggests that the MPS was 
widely accepted as a governance mechanism at least of the employment relation.     
Greif (1993) showed that the MPS was a subgame-perfect equilibrium under 
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honest agent will be rehired is not lower than the probability that an unemployed 
cheater will be rehired.  If this condition holds, under the setting of Greif (1993), the 
optimal wage, namely the wage for which it is an agent’s best response to be honest, is 
lower for an unemployed honest agent than an unemployed cheater, and hence the 
members who were not cheated will not hire the cheater. The difference in the optimal 
wage between an honest agent and a cheater is larger if (1) the difference of the 
probability of rehire between the two types of agents is larger (2) the probability of an 
exogenous discharge is lower (3) the outside option of an agent is lower and, (4) the 
discount factor is larger.  
Referring to the Greif model, we can point out that with respect to kabu nakama, 
the number of the players of the game was limited.  As mentioned above, the average 
number of kabu nakama members was approximately 31. Second, there were 
information transmission mechanisms for delivering the information on cheating to all 
the members of the nakama.  Many of the nakama codes include clauses concerning this 
issue.  The kabu nakama members shared the information on cheating by circulating a 
letter (Indigo Brokers), by registration (Firewood Wholesale Merchants, Wool and 
Cotton Brokers, Bowl, Basket and Turnery Artisans), and by publication (Firewood 
Wholesale Merchant).  In many cases, the nakama managers (gyoji) played the role of 
mediators of information transmission (Wool and Cotton Brokers, Bowl, Basket and 
Turnery Artisans, Indigo Brokers).  These two conditions, arguably, contributed to lower 
the probability that a cheater would be rehired.  Third, most “agents” were engaged in 
repeated transactions which increased the gains from being honest (Hayashi 1967). 
  Finally, the outside options of the transaction counterparts were low, because kabu 
nakama had the privilege to monopolize business in a particular area.  Because a 
cheater could find few individuals with whom to trade other than nakama members, he 
should have expected substantial loss of future profit. In this sense, the contract 
enforcement function of kabu nakama was related to the monopoly function, which has 
received much focus in the historical literature (Miyamoto 1938, Tsuda 1961, and 
Hayashi 1967).    
Why was the MPS selected as the equilibrium in Edo Era Japan, as in the society 
of Maghribis traders (Greif 1994)?  As mentioned above, the origin of kabu nakama was 
za in Medieval Japan.  Za was a group of merchants and artisans, which was affiliated to 
a powerful aristocrat, temple or shrine (Miyamoto 1938, pp. 3-9; Wakita 1969, p. 253).  
Arguably, the experience of za gave a collectivist focal point.  Also, kabu nakama 
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believed a common religion and they cooperated for the religious festivals, which 
strengthened the tie of kabu nakama (Miyamoto 1938, p.106).       
 
4. Empirical examination of the function of kabu nakama: The Tempo Reform as a 
natural experiment 
 
The Bakufu, which promoted kabu nakama in the eighteenth century, changed its 
policy in the 1840s. In the early nineteenth century, the Bakufu, whose major revenue 
source was a tax paid in terms of rice, found itself in financial difficulties. The Roju 
Tadakuni Mizuno started the Tenpo Reform in 1841 to resolve this problem. As a part of 
the Reform, the Bakufu prohibited kabu nakama, because it regarded kabu nakama as a 
major cause of the inflation (Duffy and Yamamura 1971, p. 399; Fujita 1989, pp. 
146–147). The Bakufu not only abolished kabu but it also punished those who entered 
into collusive arrangements like kabu nakama (Koda 1928, pp. 360-368). However, the 
prohibition was subsequently withdrawn in 1851 for the reason explained below 
(Miyamoto 1938, pp.337–343)6. 
We can test the function of kabu nakama by comparing the economy in the period 
from 1842 to 1851, when kabu nakama was prohibited, with the economy before that 
period. From the hypothesis presented in the previous section that the kabu nakama 
played the role of enforcing contract, we have the implication that the prohibition of 
kabu nakama would cause disruption and contraction of trade.  
Miyamoto (1938) argued that as a result of the kabu nakama prohibition, 
production decreased, the distribution system was disrupted, and a credit crunch 
occurred.  The evidence he relied on was a memorandum of the governor of Edo (Edo 
Machi Bugyo) Kagemoto Toyama in 1848.  In the memorandum, Toyama wrote that 
while the kabu was abolished, credit became difficult to obtain, prices did not fall, and 
the people became still more distressed (p.330).  In the Edo Era, most of the wholesale 
transaction was based on credit as mentioned above, and kabu nakama governed the 
transaction with credit (Miyamoto 1938, pp.195-201).  That is why a credit crunch 
occurred after the prohibition7. 
Also, the governor of Osaka (Osaka Machi Bugyo) Masayuki Abe wrote “Since 
kabu nakama was prohibited and the people have become able to trade every commodity 
freely, trade has become disrupted, prices have been unstable, and monitoring has 
become difficult.  Consequently, commodities have become unevenly distributed, local 
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p.130–131). The withdrawal of the prohibition of kabu nakama in 1851 was the result of 
the Bakufu’s accepting these opinions. 
In 1856, after the withdrawal of the prohibition, the Bakufu made bureaucrats 
(Shoshiki Gakari Myoshu)8 investigate the influence of the prohibition, and found that 
the distribution system was malfunctioning during the prohibition period (Honjo 1931).  
In addition, Honjo (1930, pp. 47-48) cited the following petition of the authority in charge 
of weavers and weaving in Nishijin, the center of traditional silk weaving in Kyoto: 
 
Nishijin weavings have been the most famous specialty of this region.  However, in 
recent years, not only weavers but also people engaged in the distribution of yarns 
have been beset by difficulties. Consequently, the traditional discipline has waned 
… weavers who entered the industry after the prohibition of kabu nakama and do 
not have serious intentions learn dishonest manipulation, which will damage the 
reputation of the specialty of Nishijin. 
 
This quotation suggests that the prohibition of kabu nakama damaged the governance of 
transactions in the Nishijin area. 
Figure 2 shows the sales of the Edo branch of Echigoya, a kimono shop managed 
by Mitsui Family. The sales declined sharply in 1842, just after the prohibition of kabu 
nakama, and stagnated at a low level after that.  It is apparent that a structural change 
took place between 1841 and 1842.  However, the sales by a certain enterprise might 
reflect influences specific to it, and especially in this case there might be a bias that 
Echigoya had enjoyed the privilege of being a member of a kabu nakama.  In order to 
avoid these problems, it is desirable to test the hypothesis using sectoral or macro data.  
For this purpose, I return to the data on the money supply referred to in Figure 1.  
Here, as the deflator, I use the average of the price indices in Edo and Osaka, explained 
below.  Figure 3 shows the growth rate of real money supply and the famine index of 
Akashi (1989). This index classifies the agricultural harvest of each year into five 
categories, from “famine” (4) to “good harvest” (0), based on Mukoyama (1917) and 
Society Section of Education Department, Tokyo Prefecture (1975). In a society like Edo 
Japan that depended heavily on agriculture, agricultural supply shocks could easily 
exert a substantial influence on the aggregate economy.  We use the famine index to 
control for these supply shocks. 
While the average growth rate of the real money supply in the period when kabu 
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prohibition (1833–1841), the rate was -0.40% per year.  Although the growth rate of real 
money supply was almost the same, the period before the prohibition includes the two 
famine while there were no famine years prior to prohibition. 
More formally, I regressed the growth rate of real money supply on a dummy 
variable, which equals to 1 if kabu nakama was prohibited in the year, and 0 otherwise 
(PROHIB), a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the famine index was 4 in the year, 
and 0 otherwise (FAMINEᶗ), a time trend (TIME), and a constant.  The expected sign of 
the two dummy variables are negative. Table 2 shows the results.  Observation years are 
from 1831 to 1852, just before General Perry came to Japan.  The coefficients of PROHIB 
and FAMINEᶗ are negative and statistically significant at 5% level. In addition, the 
absolute value of the coefficient of PROHIB is 0.0718, which means that the growth rate 
of the real money supply was 7.2% lower in the period when kabu nakama was 
prohibited than in the other period. Instead of the famine dummy, we can use famine 
index directly (FAMINEᶘ). While the significance level is slightly lower than 10% 
(p-value=0.117), the sign of PROHIB is still negative and its absolute value is 
substantial.  
The decline of economic performance in the period of kabu nakama prohibition is 
confirmed from another standpoint.  As stated in Section 2, price correlations have been 
used to measure the development of the market economy. Shinbo and Hasegawa (1988, 
pp. 262-263) pointed out that kabu nakama of merchants trading soy sauce from other 
regions was established in Kyoto in 1780, which formed a distribution system for soy 
sauce from the other regions and brought about soy sauce production in Tatsuno. This is 
an example indicating that kabu nakama contributed to form a distribution network. If 
kabu nakama supported the distribution network, we expect that the correlations of the 
prices in different regional market would decline in the period of kabu nakama 
prohibition.  Focusing on the price correlations is also useful to discriminate between the 
contract-enforcement function and the conventional monopoly hypothesis.   
Concerning the price correlations, Shinbo (1982, p. 11) pointed out that the trend 
of the relative price in Osaka, compared with that in Edo, substantially changed around 
1840. While Shinbo (1982) used the price index of a five years moving average, it is 
appropriate to use the original series for the purpose of this paper. A new price index 
was compiled by the same method using the original sources on which Shinbo (1982) 
relied, namely Kin’yu Kenkyukai (1937), Mitsui Bunko (1952), and Miyamoto (1963).  
The commodities included were unpolished rice, polished rice, barley, soybeans, raw 
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unpolished rice and 0.07 for the other items.  Figure 4 shows the price indices in Edo and 
Osaka9.  While the two were very closely correlated until the early 1840s, the correlation 
subsequently declined.  The correlation coefficient was 0.961 in the period from 1833 to 
1841, while it was 0.788 in the period from 1842 to 1850. 
Focusing on the rice price, we can perform a similar test for many areas including 
Edo and Osaka.  Iwahashi (1981) compiled time series of the rice prices for Osaka, Omi, 
Banshu, Fukuchiyama, Hiroshima, Bocho, Saga, Kumamoto, Edo, Nagoya, Shinshu, 
Aizu and Dewa.  The series from Osaka to Kumamoto are in terms of silver, while the 
others are in terms of gold.  We converted the series in terms of silver into ones in terms 
of gold, using the gold price in Osaka available in Shinbo (1978, p.173). 
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of the series for the periods 1833–1841 and 
1842–1850.  The averages of the correlation coefficients were 0.824 and 0.487 
respectively.  Comparing each coefficient with its counterpart in the other period, we 
find that in 70 out of 78 cases, the coefficients decreased in 1842–1850.   Concerning 11, 
18 and 15 cases out of 70 cases in which the coefficients decreased, the differences are 
statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Clearly, price arbitrage 
declined in the period of kabu nakama prohibition. 
Another test focuses on the inflation rate.  The monopoly hypothesis predicts that 
the inflation rate would decline, while the contract enforcement hypothesis predicts that 
the inflation rate would rise. The inflation rate was regressed on the growth rate of 
money (MONEY), PROHIB and FAMINEᶘʢTable4ʣ.  Inflation rates were calculated 
from the price indices in Edo and Osaka as explained above.  The years included are 
from 1831 to 1852.  When the average inflation rate in Edo and Osaka is used, the 
coefficient of PROHIB is positive and significant at 10% level, which is consistent with 
the contract enforcement hypothesis.  When just the inflation rate in Edo is used, the 
coefficient is again positive and significant at 5% level.  However, when just the Osaka 
inflation rate is used, the coefficient is positive but not significant.  While Edo was 
characterized as a center of consumption, Osaka was a center of distribution (Takeuchi 
1969, pp.128-129; Shinbo and Hasegawa 1988, pp.230-231). Therefore, while in Edo the 
disruption of distribution mainly resulted in decline of supply from other areas, in 
Osaka the disruption brought about decline of supply to other areas as well as decline of 
supply from other areas.    
 
5.Concluding remarks 
  13 
Economic growth in Japan started around 1790, before the Meiji Restoration.  At 
the same time, public enforcement of contracts was poorly implemented.  In this sense, 
the pre-modern Japanese economic development provides an interesting 
counter-example to the view that a public system of such enforcement is a prerequisite 
for economic development.   
Kabu nakama, a coalition of merchants or artisans, played the role of contract 
enforcement, substituting for the public authority. Many of the codes of kabu nakama 
included articles prescribing that all of the nakama members should suspend trade with 
a person who has cheated one of their own.  It implies that kabu nakama adopted a type 
of Multilateral Punishment Strategy (MPS), similar to that adopted by the coalition of 
Maghribis traders in medieval Mediterranean society.  As Greif(1993) addressed, the 
MPS of Maghribis traders reduced the incentive for the trade counterpart to cheat, and 
through it enabled expansion of trade under the condition that third party enforcement 
by the public authority was insufficient.  Kabu nakama in Edo Era Japan adopted the 
MPS not only for ordinary commercial transactions, but also for the putting out system 
and employment, and thereby, it contributed to organizing production as well as to 
expanding commerce.  
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1 In the 1960s and early 1970s, research on kabu nakama focused on its role as a part of 
the political regime in the Edo Era (Tsuda 1961; Hayashi 1967; Nakai 1971).  In recent 
years, many researchers have focused on the kabu nakama as a social group composing 
the city community (Yoshida 1985; Imai 1989).   
2 Commercialization and financial development would raise k .  So, the real money 
supply is an index which reflects wider aspects of economic development  
3 Besides the above five regions, Banshu, Fukuchiyama, Bocho, Saga, Kumamoto, 
Shinshu and Dewa are included. 
4 Calculated from Table 43 of Hayashi(1967)(p.43).  One kabu nakama whose number of 
members is not available is excluded from the average.  
5 Embezzling in the putting out system was observed also in early twentieth-century 
Japan.  Abe (1990, pp. 203-204) reports that the subcontracting weavers cheated the 
entrusting weavers through the embezzling of yarn and default on obligations in Osaka. 
6 However, this measure did not completely restore the regime before 1841 in the 
following respects.  First, the Bakufu did not issue the wooden card that certified the 
business privilege (kabu fuda), and did not collect tax (myogakin) from kabu nakama.  
Second, the Bakufu instructed kabu nakama to approve new memberships on request, 
and not to restrict their membership without an obvious reason (Miyamoto 1938, 
pp.324-338). 
7 Another reason of credit crunch relating to kabu nakama was, kabu was used as a 
collateral for credit (Miyamoto 1938, p.318). 
  19                                                                                                                                                  
8 The Monitors of the Commodity Prices were appointed from the city managers 
(myoshu) by the Bakufu in 1843 (Koda 1928, p.373). 
9 Shinbo (1982) substituted the prices concerning bean paste, soy sauce, sake and 
polished rice in Kyoto for those in Osaka, and converted them into prices in terms of gold 































































































































BE3   





0TBLB 0NJ #BOTIV 'VLVDIJZBNB)JSPTIJNB #PDIP 4BHB ,VNBNP &EP /BHPZB 4IJOTIV "J[V %FXB "WFSBHF
0TBLB  
0NJ   
#BOTIV    
'VLVDIJZBNB     
)JSPTIJNB      
#PDIP       
4BHB        
,VNBNPUP         
&EP          
/BHPZB           
4IJOTIV            
"P[V             




0TBLB 0NJ #BOTIV 'VLVDIJZBNB)JSPTIJNB #PDIP 4BHB ,VNBNP &EP /BHPZB 4IJOTIV "J[V %FXB "WFSBHF
0TBLB  
0NJ   
#BOTIV    
'VLVDIJZBNB     
)JSPTIJNB      
#PDIP       
4BHB        
,VNBNPUP         
&EP          
/BHPZB           
4IJOTIV            
"P[V             
























BE3   
/    
/PUF4FFUIFUFYU
UWBMVFTJOQBSFOUIFTFT